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Note
The Chapter 13 Cure Provisions: A Doctrine
in Need of a Cure
When a homeowner falls behind in her mortgage payments
and the mortgagee declares a default, foreclosure proceedings
typically begin with the mortgagee accelerating the loan.1 Once
accelerated, the entire amount of the mortgage loan, not just
the arrearage owed, is due and payable immediately.2 To save
the home from the foreclosure selling block, the homeowner
must meet the virtually insurmountable task of paying off the
entire loan.3
Homeowners facing this predicament often look to Chapter
13 of the federal Bankruptcy Code for assistance.4 The Code af-
fords debtors the right to cure the default - pay off the arrear-
age - and thereby de-accelerate the mortgage and reinstate the
original payment schedule.5 Unfortunately, due to federal
courts' differing interpretations of relevant Chapter 13 provi-
sions,6 homeowners seeking to save their homes through a
Chapter 13 filing may find these Code protections beyond their
reach. Many debtors may discover that they have acted too
late.
Foreclosure proceeds in stages.7 After acceleration of the
1. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANcE LAW § 1.1, at 4(2d ed. 1985).
2. I& § 7.6, at 488.
3. I& § 7.6, at 489.
4. As one court noted, "the bottom line of most Chapter 13 cases is to
preserve and avoid foreclosure of the family house." In re Thacker, 6 Bankr.
861, 865 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
5. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1377 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that Chap-
ter 13 debtors can cure default on accelerated mortgage); Downey Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Metz (In re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Foster
Mortgage Corp. v. Terry (In re Terry), 780 F.2d 894, 896 (11th Cir. 1985)
(same); Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1442 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 849 (1985) (same); In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 872
(7th Cir. 1984) (same); Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236,
237 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same); Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685
F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982) (same).
6. See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.
7. Foreclosure can be conducted judicially, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
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loan, the mortgagee obtains a state court judgment of foreclo-
sure.8 If this judgment debt is not satisfied, the home is sold at
a foreclosure sale.9 Federal appellate courts hold that a debtor
can exercise the Chapter 13 cure provisions even though the
mortgagee accelerated the mortgage before the Chapter 13 fil-
ing.'L The federal circuit courts disagree, however, whether the
same right to de-accelerate is available if the mortgagee acceler-
ated the loan and obtained a state court foreclosure judgment
before the Chapter 13 debtor filed for bankruptcy." Essen-
tially, the courts disagree whether a post-judgment filing comes
too late to save the family home.
This Note examines whether Chapter 13 permits a debtor
to cure a mortgage default after the mortgagee obtains a pre-
petition foreclosure judgment. Part I sets forth the Chapter 13
cure provisions and reviews the legislative history of their en-
actment. Part II discusses the reasoning and holdings of the
lead cases considering the effect of a pre-petition foreclosure
judgment on the debtor's right to cure. Part III critiques these
decisions, focusing on the analytical problems inherent in each
court's approach. The Note finds each circuit's approach imper-
fect, and concludes that Chapter 13 should be interpreted to
provide for a right to cure even after entry of a state court fore-
closure judgment.
supra note 1, § 7.11, at 505, or independent of the courts through a power-of-
sale clause in the mortgage agreement. IH. § 7.19, at 534. Judicial foreclosure is
permitted in every state, id § 7.11, at 505-06, whereas power-of-sale foreclo-
sures are permitted in only half the states. Id. § 7.19, at 534. For purposes of
this Note, "foreclosure" will refer to judicial foreclosure.
8. See id. § 7.11, at 506.
9. See id. Judgment and sale are just the highlights. Judicial foreclosure
actually is a time-consuming and elaborate procedure:
A typical action in equity to foreclose and sell involves a long series of
steps: a preliminary title search to determine all parties in interest;
filing of the foreclosure bill of complaint and lis pendens notice; ser-
vice of process; a hearing, usually by a master in chancery who then
reports to the court; the decree or judgment; notice of sale; actual sale
and issuance of certificate of sale; report of the sale; proceedings for
determination of the right to any surplus; possible redemptions from
foreclosure sale; and the entry of a decree for a deficiency.
10. See cases cited supra note 5.
11. See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text; see generally G. NELSON
& D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 699 n.1 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing judicial controversy over the
proper limit on the Chapter 13 right to cure).
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I. THE CHAPTER 13 CURE PROVISIONS
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code' 2 authorizes adjust-
ment of debts of individuals with regular income.13 On filing a
Chapter 13 petition, a debtor falls within the protection of the
statutory "automatic stay," which temporarily blocks all enti-
ties from taking action against the debtor or the debtor's prop-
erty.14 While behind the automatic stay's protective shield, the
debtor must propose a "plan" that explains how she intends to
address her outstanding obligations.15 Under section 1322(b)(2),
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988).
13. Chapter 13 is an alternative to Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174
(1988), which provides for the liquidation of the debtor's assets. Chapter 13 is
limited to individuals with unsecured indebtedness of no more than $100,000
and secured indebtedness of no more than $350,000. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
Chapter 12 of the Code, modeled after Chapter 13, provides analogous relief to
family farmers. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1988). Chapter 12 was enacted in 1986
in response to growing concern that neither Chapter 13 nor Chapter 11, 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988) (business reorganization), afforded effective relief to
family farmers facing bankruptcy. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 48, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnmI. NEws 5246, 5249 (noting
most family farmers have too much debt to qualify under Chapter 13 and
many have found Chapter 11 needlessly complicated, unduly time-consuming,
inordinately expensive and unworkable).
14. Section 362(a) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition oper-
ates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been com-
inenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title.
U.S.E § 362(a) (1988).
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections under the
Bankruptcy Code. "It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It
stops all collection efforts, all harassment and all foreclosure actions. It per-
mits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or simply to be
relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD-
AIN. NEWS 5787, 5840-41; see also In re Fitch, 102 Bankr. 139, 140 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1989) (stating that section 362 "bars any action affecting the Debtor's inter-
est from the time of filing") (emphasis added); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY %
362.01, at 362-67 (14th ed. 1978) (noting that the automatic stay provides for "a
broad stay of litigation, lien enforcement, and other actions, judicial or other-
wise, which would affect or interfere with property of the estate").
15. The Code merely states "[tihe debtor shall file a plan." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (1988). Absent a showing of cause, the plan must be filed within 15 days
of the filing of the petition. BANiK R. 3015.
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the plan may "modify" secured claims, except those secured by
a security interest in the debtor's residence.' 6 Under section
1322(b)(5), the debtor's plan can "cure" any default within a
reasonable time on any long-term claims.17
Congress enacted sections 1322(b)(2) and 1322(b)(5) as part
of the 1978 overhaul of the federal bankruptcy system.,' Pre-
viously, Congress had created the Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States to study the bankruptcy laws
and recommend avenues for reform.19 Given Congress's con-
(a) The plan shall-
(1) provide for the submission of all or such portion of future
earnings or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and
control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan;
(2) provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of
all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of this title, unless the
holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such
claim; and
(3) if the plan classifies claims, provide the same treatment for
each claim within a particular class.
(c) The plan may not provide for payments over a period that is
longer than three years, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer
period, but the court may not approve a period that is longer than five
years.
11 U.S.C § 1322 (1988).
16. Section 1322(b)(2) provides that the plan may "modify the rights of
holders of secured claims other than a claim secured only by a security inter-
est in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of un-
secured claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
The Code does not define "modify." As used in § 1322(b)(2), modify indi-
cates a change in the terms of the obligation, such as a reduction in the
amount of payments or a reduction of the amount owed. Grubbs v. Houston
First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). In contrast, to
"cure" simply means to remit the arrearage owed to the creditor. I at 244.
The Code broadly defines "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not
... reduced to judgment." 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988). "Security interest" is
defined as a "lien created by an agreement." Id at § 101(45). "Lien," in turn,
is defined as a "charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a
debt or performance of an obligation." Id. at § 101(33).
17. Section 1322(b)(5) provides that the plan may -
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for
the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance
of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or se-
cured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which
the final payment under the plan is due.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988). See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
For a more thorough exposition of the mechanics of a Chapter 13 filing,
see Comment, Home Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 643-50, 654-55 (1983).
18. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1322(b)(2), (5),
92 Stat. 2549, 2649.
19. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc.
[Vol. 74:921
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cern about the growing number of consumer bankruptcies, 20
the Commission focused considerable attention on the adequacy
of Chapter XIII,21 one of the Code chapters governing con-
sumer, or personal, bankruptcy.22
The Commission identified a number of inadequacies in
Chapter XIII, including the Code's treatment of secured claims.
Before 1978, court approval of a debtor's Chapter XIII plan re-
quired the written consent of all secured creditors whose claims
were affected by the plan.23 Depending on how a particular
bankruptcy court applied this provision, secured creditors who
objected to a proposed modification of their claims could veto
debtors' efforts to emerge from bankruptcy.2 Even when the
outstanding obligation exceeded the value of the creditor's se-
curity, some courts held that the secured creditor could block
the debtor's Chapter XIII plan unless the creditor's claim was
fully satisfied.2
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT].
20. In fiscal year 1946, there were 10,196 bankruptcy filings, a 40-year low.
COMIISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 2. By fiscal year 1967 this number had
reached 208,329 filings, of which 191,729 were consumer, or nonbusiness, fil-
ings. Id. During this period, consumer bankruptcies as a percentage of total
bankruptcies increased from 84% to 92%. Id
In addition to concern over the increased number of bankruptcies, the
Commission identified several other areas of concern that led to its formation:
administrative costs, delays and inefficiencies throughout the bankruptcy sys-
tem; the inadequacy of relief afforded both debtors and creditors; and the lack
of national uniformity in the treatment of debtors and creditors. Id. at 3-4.
21. The former Bankruptcy Code delineated Code chapters by roman nu-
meral. The current Code uses arabic numbers.
22. See generally CoimIssIoN REPORT, supra note 19, at 158-67 (discussing
the inadequacies of personal bankruptcy provisions and recommendations for
reform).
23. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 165 (citing § 652(1) of the for-
mer Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 652(1), 52 Stat. 840, 934 (1938), repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2549).
A creditor was deemed "affected" by the debtor's plan if his interest was "ma-
terially and adversely affected thereby." Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 607, 52
Stat. 840, 931 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598 § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2549. In practice, the criterion was whether the se-
cured creditor was being "dealt with in the plan;" if so, the creditor was "af-
fected." 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcy f 22.10, at 49 (14th ed. 1978).
24. COMIISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 165.
25. The House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 described the secured creditor veto problem this
way:
Most often in a consumer case, a secured creditor has a security inter-
est in property that is virtually worthless to anyone but the debtor.
The creditor obtains a security interest in all the debtor's furniture,
clothes, cooking utensils, and other personal effects. These items
1990]
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The former Bankruptcy Act also precluded the debtor
from dealing with claims secured by real property in her Chap-
ter XIII plan.2 6 Thus, although the debtor often was required
to make installment payments on a real estate mortgage or con-
tract for the purchase of her home, the plan could not address
that obligation.27 The home mortgage, often a Chapter XIII
debtor's principal indebtedness, was excluded from a Chapter
XIII proceeding.
The Commission's recommendations provided the basis for
sections 1322(b)(2) and 1322(b)(5) of the current Bankruptcy
Code. To eliminate the secured creditor veto, the Commission
proposed that the debtor be allowed to alter or modify claims
secured by personal property.28 Along with other recommen-
dations, this reform would enable the debtor to reduce the se-
cured claim to the actual value of the collateral. 29 The
have little or no resale value. They do, however, have a high replace-
ment cost. The mere threat of repossession operates as pressure on
the debtor to pay the secured creditor more than he would receive
were he actually to repossess and sell the goods.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6085.
Courts often escaped the harshness of the rule by allowing the debtor to
delete from her plan any reference to the secured claim, thus obviating the
need to gain the consent of the secured creditor. COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 19, at 165. Courts protected the debtor from this creditor by invoking
their broad injunctive powers to enjoin the creditor from repossessing the col-
lateral. 1d. at 165-66.
26. Section 606(1) of the former Bankruptcy Act defined "claim," for the
purposes of Chapter XIII, as including "all claims of whatever character
against the debtor or his property, ... whether secured or unsecured, liqui-
dated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, but shall not include claims secured
by estates in real property or chattels real." Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 606(1),
52 Stat. 840, 930 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2549 (emphasis added).
27. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 13.
28. The Commission recommended that the debtor's plan be allowed to
"include provisions dealing with claims secured by personal property severally,
on any terms, and may provide for the curing of defaults within a reasonable
time and otherwise alter or modify the rights of the holders of such claims."
REPORT OF THE COMM'N. ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 204 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT, pt. 2].
29. The House Committee report explained:
The bill requires the court to value the secured creditor's interest. To
the extent of the value of the security interest, he is treated as having
a secured claim, entitled to be paid in full under the plan .... To the
extent that his claim against the debtor exceeds the value of his col-
lateral, he is treated as having an unsecured claim, and he will receive
payment along with all other general unsecured creditors. ... This is
an important departure from a few misguided decisions under current
law, under which a secured creditor with a $2000 secured [sic] by
[Vol. 74:921
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Commission suggested a more limited reform for mortgage
loans. Although the debtor's plan could not modify or alter the
mortgage obligation, the plan could provide for the curing of
defaults and the maintenance of mortgage payments. 3 0
household goods worth only $200 is entitled in some cases to his full
$2000 claim, in preference to all unsecured creditors.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 5963, 6085.
30. The Commission proposed that the Chapter 13 plan "may include pro-
visions for the curing of defaults within a reasonable time and the mainte-
nance of payments while the case is pending on claims secured by a lien on the
debtor's residence." COMIMISSION REPORT, pt. 2, supra note 28, at 204. This
new "limited authority," the Commission noted, "does not authorize reduction
of the size or varying of the time of installment payments." Id. at 205-06.
Some courts had, under the old Code, permitted Chapter XIII debtors to
cure past defaults and maintain their mortgage payments. These courts did so,
however, through their broad injunctive power to protect the debtor's prop-
erty. See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 614, 52 Stat. 840, 931 (1938), repeazed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 105, 92 Stat. 2549, 2555
(stating that "[tihe court may ... enjoin or stay until final decree any act or
the commencement or continuation of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon
the property of a debtor").
In In re Cassidy, 401 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), the court outlined the
relevant factors for determining whether creditors should be enjoined from
foreclosing on their security: the debtor is acting in good faith and the plan is
feasible; the stay is necessary to preserve the debtor's estate or the debtor's
ability to execute the plan; and the injunction "should not impair the tecured
creditor's security and should be conditioned on the curing of delinquent
amounts due the secured creditor within a reasonably short period." Id. at
758-59. See, e.g., Hallenback v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 572 (4th
Cir. 1963) (holding that the bankruptcy referee, in the exercise of sound dis-
cretion, may enjoin foreclosure on the debtor's home despite the fact that a
Chapter XIII plan cannot deal with the mortgage debt); In re Pizzolato, 281 F.
Supp. 109, 111-12 (W.D. Ark. 1967) (enjoining foreclosure and holding that
debtor could cure defaults when claim held by nonconsenting secured creditor
"is not materially and adversely affected"); In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459, 460
(N.D. Ala. 1962) (approving of injunction against mortgage foreclosure and the
maintenance of regular mortgage payments, when debtor cured defaults at
time of plan's confirmation and debtor's equity in home was greater than the
outstanding mortgage debt).
The Commission endorsed the result of these cases and thus sought to
codify it as part of the statutory protections available to the Chapter 13 debtor.
See COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 13 (noting that "courts have fre-
quently enjoined foreclosure of real estate mortgages and contracts during the
pendency of a Chapter XIII case and have in other ways recognized the need
of a Chapter XIII petitioner for protection of his right to keep his equity in his
home during his performance of the terms of a Chapter XIII plan"); see also
United Cos. Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 Bankr. 178, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980)
(stating that "section 1322(b)(5) is a statutory codification of the practice de-
veloped under former Chapters XI and XIH wherein the injunctive power...
was sometimes utilized not to modify the rights of a creditor but to postpone
his remedies upon reasonable and equitable terms and conditions in aid of a
worthy rehabilitation plan.") (citations omitted).
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The House and Senate redrafted and amended these rec-
ommendations,31 although ultimately sections 1322(b)(2) and
1322(b)(5) continued to reflect the Commission's proposals.3 2
Unfortunately, neither the Commission nor the Congress ad-
dressed the relationship between the cure provisions of section
1322(b)(5) and the various stages of foreclosure.33 This issue,
particularly the effect of a foreclosure judgment on the Chap-
ter 13 right to cure a mortgage default, now divides the federal
circuits.
31. In the House bankruptcy reform bill, the modification of secured
claims recommended by the Commission was expanded to cover all claims, not
just those secured by personal property. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav.
Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). The House version thus
would have permitted the debtor's modification of a mortgage debt.
This deviation from the Commission's recommendation ran into opposi-
tion in the Senate. In Senate hearings, counsel for the Senior Vice-President
of the Real Estate Division of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance testified
on the proposed legislation:
With respect to the savings and loans, in particular, and the future
prospects for loans to individuals under the proposed bills, there is re-
ally only one basic problem. That is, the provision in both bills that
provides for modification of the right of the secured creditor on resi-
dential mortgages, a provision that is not contained in present law.
[S]avings and loans will continue to make loans to individual
homeowners, but they will tend to be, I believe, extraordinarily con-
servative and more conservative than they are now in the flow of
credit.
It seems to me they will have to recognize that there is an addi-
tional business risk presented by either or both of these two bills if
the Congress enacts chapter XIII in the form proposed, thus providing
for the possibility of modification of the rights of the secured creditor
in the residential mortgage area.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R, 8200 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 715 (1977) (statement of Robert E.
O'Malley, Counsel to the Senior Vice President, Real Estate Division, Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.).
In response to concerns that the House version would reduce the flow of
lending capital to the home mortgage market, the Senate amended the pro-
posed § 1322(b)(2) to prevent any modification of claims secured by real estate.
Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245. Floor amendments in both houses narrowed this lan-
guage to exempt from modification only those claims secured by real property
which is the debtor's principle residence. Id. at 246. See supra note 16 and ac-
companying text.
32. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
33. See In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428, 1435 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[w]e
wish Congress had spoken its specific intent more clearly with respect to cases
involving acceleration, judgments, or sales").
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II. INTERPRETING THE CHAPTER 13 CURE
PROVISIONS
A. IN RE TADDEO: THE SEcoND CIRCUIT SETS THE STAGE
The Second Circuit was the first federal appellate court to
interpret sections 1322(b)(2) and 1322(b)(5). In In re Taddeo,3
the court held that section 1322(b)(5) allows Chapter 13 debtors
to cure a mortgage default even though the mortgagee acceler-
ated the mortgage before the Chapter 13 petition was filed.35
34. 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982).
35. The homeowners in Taddeo defaulted on their mortgage. Id at 25.
The mortgagee accelerated and commenced foreclosure proceedings, but
before the mortgagee obtained a final judgment of foreclosure, the homeown-
ers filed under Chapter 13. Id. at 26.
The homeowners proposed to cure the default by paying off the arrearage
during the life of the Chapter 13 plan. Id. at 26. The mortgagee objected and
petitioned the court for relief from the automatic stay so that she could pro-
ceed with foreclosure. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the mortgagee's peti-
tion. Id.
The mortgagee's primary argument before the Second Circuit was that the
debtors could not invoke § 1322(b)(5) to cure the payment default and rein-
state the mortgage because subdivision (5) only permits debtors to cure se-
cured claims when the "last payment is due after the last payment under the
plan is due." Id. at 28. As the mortgage had been accelerated and was there-
fore payable in full immediately, the mortgagee argued that the claim no
longer was one in which the last payment was due after the scheduled termi-
nation of the plan. Id Allowing cure after acceleration, the mortgagee ar-
gued, would "modify" her rights as a holder of a claim secured by the debtor's
residence, a direct violation of section 1322(b)(2). Id.
The Second Circuit rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the
court held that "the power to cure must comprehend the power to ',de-acceler-
ate.'" Id. at 26. The court reasoned that "[a] default is an event in, the debtor-
creditor relationship that triggers certain consequences - here, acceleration"
and that "[c]uring a default commonly means taking care of the triggering
event and returning to pre-default conditions." Id at 26-27. The Second Cir-
cuit stated that policy considerations support this construction of the statute:
Conditioning a debtor's right to cure on its having filed a Chapter 13
petition prior to acceleration would prompt unseemly and wasteful
races to the courthouse. Worse, these would be races in which mort-
gagees possess an unwarranted and likely insurmountable advantage:
wage earners seldom will possess the sophistication in bankruptcy
matters that financial institutions do, and often will not have retained
counsel in time for counsel to do much good. In contrast, permitting
debtors in the Taddeos' position to de-accelerate by payment of the ar-
rearages will encourage parties to negotiate in good faith rather than
having to fear that the mortgagee will tip the balance irrevocably by
accelerating or that the debtor may prevent or at least long postpone
this by filing a Chapter 13 petition.
Id. at 27.
Second, the court reasoned that the ban on modifying home mortgages in
§ 1322(b) did not limit the debtor's power to cure under § 1322(b)(5), see supra
notes 16 and 17, because "we do not read 'curing defaults' under (b)(3) or 'cur-
1990]
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Despite criticism of the Taddeo court's statutory analysis,36 fed-
eral appellate courts uniformly agree that a Chapter 13 debtor
can cure a mortgage default even though the debt was acceler-
ated before the Chapter 13 filing.37 The federal circuits differ,
however, as to the applicability of section 1322(b) where the
debtor files for bankruptcy after a state court enters a judg-
ment of foreclosure.38
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Focus ON TITLE THEORY
The Seventh Circuit addressed the effect of a pre-petition
foreclosure judgment on the debtor's right to cure under sec-
tion 1322(b) in In re Clark.3 9 In Clark, debtor homeowners
filed for Chapter 13 protection after entry of a foreclosure judg-
ment but before the foreclosure sale.40 The mortgagee objected
to the Clarks' Chapter 13 plan41 on the ground that the cure
provisions of section 1322(b) were unavailable once a state court
ing defaults and maintaining payments' under (b)(5) to be modifications of
claims." Id. (emphasis in original).
36. See Zaretsky, Bankruptcy: Commentary: Some Limits on Mortgagees'
Rights in Chapter 13, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 433, 441-43 (1984) (noting that
"[a]s a matter of technical statutory interpretation, the Second Circuit's rea-
soning is not entirely satisfying"). For a more thorough review of the legisla-
tive history of the Chapter 13 cure provisions, see Grubbs v. Houston First Am.
Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 238-46 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
37. See supra note 5. The Taddeo result also has found support among
commentators. See Comment, Home Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 17, at 664-65 (arguing that Chapter 13
debtors should be permitted to cure defaults despite acceleration of the mort-
gage); Comment, Bankruptcy-Mortgages-Despite Pre-Bankruptcy Accelera-
tion of a Mortgage Under State Law, A Debtor Can Cure Default and Reinstate
the Original Payment Schedule Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 52
U. CIN. L. REV. 196, 205-06 (1983) (noting that the Taddeo court made a fair
and accurate assimilation of the statutory language and relevant policy consid-
erations); Comment, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: When May a Mortgage Debtor
Cure the Accelerated Mortgage Debt Using Section 1322(b) (5) ?, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 109, 132 (1982) (arguing that § 1322(5) may be used to cure a mortgage
default even if the mortgage is accelerated).
38. See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.
39. 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984).
40. Id at 870. Hugh and Joanne Clark financed the purchase of their
home by a mortgage with the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul. The Clarks used
the home until the winter of 1981-82, when they abandoned the house due to
water damage from frozen pipes. On September 3, 1981, the Bank commenced
judicial foreclosure proceedings. When the Clarks did not respond to the fore-
closure complaint, the state court entered a judgment of foreclosure on Febru-
ary 2, 1982. The Clarks filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 on May 27,
1982, before the scheduled foreclosure sale. Id
41. The Clarks proposed to cure the arrearage over the 36 month life of
their Chapter 13 plan. Id
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entered a foreclosure judgment.4
The Clark court looked to applicable state law to deter-
mine the effect of a foreclosure judgment.43 In particular, the
Seventh Circuit considered whether the foreclosure judgment
transferred legal and equitable title from the mortgagor to the
mortgagee. If the judgment passed title, the court reasoned,
the property no longer could be considered part of the bank-
ruptcy estate" and within the protection of the automatic
stay.45
The Seventh Circuit determined that a Wisconsin foreclo-
sure judgment did not transfer legal and equitable title to the
mortgagee. Wisconsin, the court noted, follows the lien theory
of mortgages; 46 even after a court has entered a foreclosure
42. Id. at 871.
43. Id.
44. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion creates a "bankruptcy estate." The Code reads, in pertinent part:
(a) The commencement of a case under ... this title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever lo-
cated and by whomever held
(1) ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
The Clark court was not the first to address § 1322(b) in terms of the
property of the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 849
F.2d 1078, 1090 (8th Cir. 1988) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that the right
to cure should survive until final divestment of the debtor's interest in the
property under state law); Nimai Kumar Ghosh v. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n (In re Nimai Kumar Ghosh), 38 Bankr. 600, 602 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(denying right to cure after foreclosure sale because all legal and equitable
rights of debtor terminated at foreclosure sale under New York State law);
Thompson v. Great Lakes Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Thompson), 17
Bankr. 748, 751 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that right to cure survives
until state law terminates debtor's interest in the property); First Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 29 Bankr. 380, 381 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (hold-
ing that Chapter 13 debtor can cure default as long as debtor retains an inter-
est in the home at the time the petition is filed); In re Butchman, 4 Bankr. 379,
380 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
45. See supra note 14.
46. In lien theory states, the mortgagor has legal and equitable title (until
foreclosure) and the mortgagee holds a security interest in the mortgaged
property. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 4.2, at 145-46. Most states
follow the lien theory of mortgages. According to a 1965 survey, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming and possibly Missouri are considered lien
theory states. Id. at 145 n.1 (citing Comment, Proposed Changes in Minnesota
Mortgage Law, 50 MINN. L. REV. 331, 339 (1965); POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRU-
DENCE § 1188 (1941)). Recent statutory changes indicate that Illinois may also
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judgment, the mortgagee holds only a lien against the prop-
erty.47 The court distinguished the effect of a foreclosure judg-
ment in Wisconsin48 from states in which entry of a foreclosure
judgment effectively transfers legal and equitable title to the
mortgagee.49 Having concluded that the Clarks had legal and
equitable title at the time of filing, and that their home was in-
cluded in the bankruptcy estate, the Clark court then consid-
ered whether the debtors could exercise the statutory right to
cure. Following the reasoning of Taddeo, the court held that
the debtors could cure the mortgage default.50
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the right to cure sur-
vives a foreclosure judgment in lien theory states. Although
the court did not expressly proclaim the contrary rule - that
the right to cure is unavailable after entry of a foreclosure
judgment in title theory states - the implication is clear.51 In-
deed, the bankruptcy courts within the Seventh Circuit have
be a lien theory state. See In re Josephs, 85 Bankr. 500, 505 n.6 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill.), ffl'd, 93 Bankr. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
A minority of states follow the title theory of mortgages. Under the title
theory, the mortgagee holds legal title to the mortgaged property as security
until the mortgage debt has been paid or foreclosed. G. NELSON & D. WHiT-
MAN, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 142. A recent study identified Alabama, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island as
adhering to the title theory of mortgages. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of
Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 322-24 (1987). There is conflicting authority on
whether Pennsylvania follows the lien theory or title theory. Id at 324.
47. Clark, 738 F. 2d at 871.
48. The court noted that a Wisconsin foreclosure judgment does not de-
stroy the mortgage lien, but merely judicially determines the amount. Id
49. Id. at 871 n.3.
50. Id at 874. The court followed the reasoning of Taddeo and Grubbs v.
Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), a
Fifth Circuit decision in accord with Taddeo, holding that the cure provisions
would be meaningless if the right to cure did not survive acceleration of the
mortgage debt. Clark, 738 F.2d at 872-74; see also supra note 35 (describing the
Taddeo court's statutory analysis). The Clark court recognized that Grubbs
and Taddeo were cases in which the mortgagee had not yet obtained a final
judgment of foreclosure but concluded that "in Wisconsin such a judgment
adds nothing of consequence as far as § 1322(b) is concerned." Clark, 738 F.2d
at 874.
51. Immediately after noting that Wisconsin law differs from states in
which the judgment effectuates a transfer of title, the Clark court cited one
case with the parenthetical, "Wisconsin follows 'lien' theory of mortgages,"
and another case with the parenthetical, "mortgagor loses interest in property
only after foreclosure sale." Id at 871; see also Sable, A Chapter 13 Debtor's
Right to Cure Default Under Section 1322(b): A Problem of Interpretation, 57
AM. BANKR. L.J. 127, 131 (1983) (noting that whether a state follows the title
theory or the lien theory of mortgages is dispositive of the applicability of the
Chapter 13 cure provisions).
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interpreted Clark as drawing this distinction between lien and
title theory states.52
C. THE THIRD CIRCUIT: A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
Debtor homeowners filed a Chapter 13 petition during the
statutory redemption period following foreclosure sale in In re
Roach.53 The Third Circuit considered whether the right to
cure survives the pre-petition judgment of foreclosure. 54 Un-
like the Cark court, the Third Circuit focused on the mortgage
debt rather than on the judgment's impact on the debtors' in-
terest in the property.55
After a general discussion of the relationship between state
and federal law in the context of bankruptcy,56 the Roach court
52. In In re Schnupp, 64 Bankr. 763 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1986), a case arising
under Illinois law, the bankruptcy court held that the debtors could cure the
default because "[i]n Illinois as in Wisconsin, no title passes upon foreclosure
order because both states are 'lien' states, not 'title' states." IH, at 767. The
court ruled that even if Illinois were a title theory state, state law is pre-
empted by federal law when state law frustrates the policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 768-69. After discussing the broad rehabilitative pur-
poses of Chapter 13, the court concluded that "if Illinois were a title theory
state, there would result a conflict between Illinois and federal law." Id. at
769.
In In re Josephs, 85 Bankr. 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 93 Bankr. 151
(N.D. Ill. 1988), the court discerned from Clark and Goldberg v. Tynan (In re
Tynan), 773 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985), another Seventh Circuit Chapter 13 deci-
sion, that the right to cure is lost "when the foreclosure process reaches a
point at which the pre-foreclosure relationship between the mortgagor and
mortgagee has ended, so that it can be said that the mortgagor's title has effec-
tively been transferred." Josephs, 85 Bankr. at 504. The court concluded that
in Illinois, as in Wisconsin, the mortgagee retains only a lien on the mortgaged
property, regardless of whether the mortgage document purports to grant the
mortgagee legal title to the property. Id at 505-06.
In In re Demoff, 90 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988), a case arising
under Indiana law, the court made a lengthy comparison between Wisconsin
and Indiana law, including the point that both states are lien theory states and
not title theory states. Id. at 397-98.
53. 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc). Benny and Edith Roach's home
was subject to a mortgage held by GMAC Mortgage Company. Id. at 1371.
The Roaches fell behind on their mortgage payments. GMAC declared a de-
fault, accelerated the mortgage and subsequently obtained a foreclosure judg-
ment. The property was sold to a third party at a sheriff's sale. Under New
Jersey law, after a foreclosure sale the sheriff must "deliver a good and suffi-
cient conveyance in pursuance of the sale unless a motion for the hearing of
an objection to the sale is served upon him within 10 days after the sale." The
Roaches filed a Chapter 13 petition within the 10 day period. Id.
54. Id at 1377.
55. Id.
56. The court began with the basic premise that absent a conflict between
state property and federal bankruptcy law, state law governs questions of
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held that the right to cure did not survive a pre-petition fore-
closure judgment.57 The court reasoned that section 1322(b)(5),
which allows a Chapter 13 debtor to cure a default on a long-
term secured claim,58 authorizes curing of defaults in a "con-
tractual relationship."-5 9 Yet in New Jersey, once the state
court enters a foreclosure judgment, the mortgage merges into
the judgment and ceases to exist under state law.60 Thus, there
no longer is a contractual relationship between the debtor and
the mortgagee. 61 There is nothing left to cure.
After determining the applicable state law, the Roach court
examined the Bankruptcy Code for possible reasons to preempt
state law and set aside the foreclosure judgment.6 2 The court
could not find any support for preemption in the statutory lan-
guage because "cure" and "default" have no meaning with re-
property rights. Id. at 1373 (citing Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270,
273 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984)). The Third Circuit
quoted at length from the lead Supreme Court case on the relationship be-
tween bankruptcy and state property law:
[P]roperty interests are created and defined by state law. Unless
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform
treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts
within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shop-
ping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by rea-
son of the happenstance of bankruptcy.'
Id. at 1374 (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (citation
omitted)). The court concluded with the proposition that "absent a counter-
vailing interest, 'the basic federal rule is that state law governs."' Id (quoting
Butner, 440 U.S. at 57).
57. Id at 1377.
58. See supra note 17 (text of § 1322(b)(5)).
59. Roach, 824 F.2d at 1377 (emphasis added).
60. The doctrine of merger provides that once a plaintiff receives a judg-
ment on a claim, the plaintiff is barred from any future action on that claim.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18, at 151-52 (1982). "[The] original
claim is extinguished and rights upon the judgment are substituted for it. The
plaintiff's original claim is said to be 'merged' in the original judgment." Id.,
comment a.
The Roach court was not the first to apply the doctrine of merger to pre-
clude a Chapter 13 debtor from curing a mortgage default subsequent to the
entry of a pre-petition foreclosure judgment. See, e.g., In re Martinez, 73
Bankr. 300, 303-04 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1987); In re Akins, 55 Bankr. 183, 185
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); First Fin. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Winkler, 29 Bankr.
771, 773 (N.D. IlM. 1983); In re Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254, 258 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981); In re Jenkins, 14 Bankr. 748, 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Canady, 9
Bankr. 428, 430 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
61. Roach, 824 F. 2d at 1377.
62. Id- at 1378.
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gard to judgments.63 Nor could it find such authority in the
legislative history of the bankruptcy code.6 The court ul-
timately turned to policy considerations, but again found little
to justify extending the opportunity to cure beyond the foreclo-
sure judgment.65 The Roach court held that the "minimal aid"
provided by exatending the debtor's right to cure was out-
weighed by the "uncertainties in the application of state prop-
erty law and the clouding of real estate titles" that would result
from upsetting foreclosure judgments.66
D. THE SIXTH CiRcurr: A UNIFoRM RULE
The Sixth Circuit addressed the appropriate limit on the
statutory right to cure in In re Glenn.67 In Glenn, homeowners
failed to make several mortgage payments, and the mortgagee
accelerated the loan.68 The debtors filed a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy petition several hours after a state court entered a fore-
closure judgment.69
The Sixth Circuit first reviewed the legislative history of
the Chapter 13 cure provisions.7" The court found that in revis-
ing Chapter 13 Congress had two competing concerns in mind.
63. Id.
64. The Third Circuit noted that legislative history did not indicate
whether the cure provisions of § 1322(b) were intended to override state court
judgments. The court concluded that Congress would have explicitly ad-
dressed preemption of state court judgments if it had intended such a result:
If Congress had intended to grant such authority [to set aside state
court judgments], we think its sensitivity to considerations of comity
would have resulted in some explanation of the necessity for the in-
trusion on state sovereignty. In the absence of any such explanation,
we can only conclude that Congress did not see cures of mortgage de-
faults as any threat to the integrity of state court judgments.
65. As New Jersey law gives the mortgagor 20 days to file an answer to a
complaint in a judicial foreclosure proceeding, the court reasoned that a debtor
has ample time to seek legal counsel - and, if necessary, file a Chapter 13 pe-
tition - before a final foreclosure judgment is returned. Id.
66. Id.; accord Comment, Accelerated Mortgages: An Unsolved Problem of
Interpretation in Chapter 13, 19 Hous. L. REv. 951, 972-79 (1982) (endorsing
line of cases that look to the presence of state court action to determine the
applicability of § 1322(b)(5)).
67. Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428 (6th Cir.
1985). The case consolidated three appeals. In one, the Chapter 13 debtors pe-
titioned for bankruptcy after entry of a foreclosure judgment. In the other
two, filing occurred after foreclosure sale, but before expiration of the statu-
tory redemption period. Id. at 1429-30.
68. Id. at 1430.
69. Id
70. Id. at 1432.
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On one hand, Congress sought to expand the relief available
under Chapter 13 to "encourage consumer debtor rehabilita-
tion."7' On the other hand, Congress was concerned that exces-
sive debtor protection in the home mortgage area would reduce
the flow of mortgage lending capital.7 2 Thus, the cure provi-
sions represented an attempt to strike a balance between these
competing concerns.73
The Glenn court then turned to the specific question of the
proper limit on the Chapter 13 cure provisions. Finding that
neither the statutory language nor the legislative history indi-
cated whether Congress intended the right to cure to survive
until acceleration, judgment, or sale,74 the Sixth Circuit fash-
ioned a "pragmatic" rule, which, it believed, would work "the
least violence to the competing concerns evident in the lan-
guage. ' '75 Based on its analysis of the policies underlying Chap-
ter 13, the court selected foreclosure sale as the cut-off point
for exercise of the debtor's right to cure.76 The Glenn court did
71. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 116-17 (1977), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5963, 6076-78). See
supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history).
72. Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1434. See supra note 31.
73. The court viewed the compromise as follows. Section 1322(b)(2)
grants debtors the power to modify secured claims. Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1434.
See supra note 16. To protect mortgage lenders, home mortgage loans are ex-
pressly excluded from this power to modify. Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1434. To avoid
undermining the rehabilitative goals of the revised Chapter, however, Con-
gress limited the special protection granted to home mortgage lenders. First,
the protection applies to claims secured "only" by a security interest in the
debtor's principle residence, thus excluding loans when the home serves as ad-
ditional security. Id. See supra note 16. Second, §§ 1322(b)(3)-(b)(5), both
granting the right to cure defaults, do not exempt mortgage loans. Glenn, 760
F.2d at 1434. Moreover, the court noted, the § 1322(b)(5) right to cure defaults
on long-term claims operates "notwithstanding" the § 1322(b)(2) ban on modi-
fying home mortgage loans. Id.
74. Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1435. Foreclosure proceeds in stages. See supra
notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
76. Id. The court outlined its reasons for selecting foreclosure sale as the
proper termination point:
(a) The language of the statute is, to us, plainly a compromise ....
Picking a date between the two extremes, is likewise a compromise of
sorts.
(b) The sale of the mortgaged property is an event that all forms of
foreclosure, however denominated, seem to have in common. . ..
[Tihe date of sale is a measurable, identifiable event of importance in
the relationship of the parties. It is at the heart of realization of the
security.
(c) Although the purchaser at the sale is frequently the security
holder itself, the sale introduces a new element-the change of own-
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not justify its decision based on state law,77 concluding that
state practice varies so much that any effort to accommodate
one state's mortgage law would only create confusion in the
next.78
III. THE CURE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1322: A
DOCTRINE IN NEED OF A CURE
The three circuits that have addressed the effect of a fore-
closure judgment on the Chapter 13 right to cure have followed
markedly different paths. The Seventh Circuit focuses on the
debtor's interest in the home at the time she filed for bank-
ruptcy.79 Under this approach, the right to cure survives until
foreclosure sale in lien theory states, but the right to cure is
lost at foreclosure judgment in title theory states. The Third
Circuit rejects this mortgage theory approach, focusing instead
on the contractual relationship between the mortgagee and
mortgagor.8 0 When the mortgage "merges" into a foreclosure
judgment and is extinguished under state law, the debtor loses
the right to cure at judgment.81 The Sixth Circuit eschews the
state law approach, holding that the debtor's right to cure a
mortgage default survives until foreclosure sale regardless of
ership and, hence, the change of expectations-into the relationship
which previously existed.
(d) The foreclosure sale normally comes only after considerable no-
tice giving the debtor opportunity to take action by seeking alterna-
tive financing or by negotiating to cure the default or by taking
advantage of the benefits of Chapter 13 ....
(e) Any earlier date meets with the complaint that the rights con-
ferred by the statute upon debtors to cure defaults have been
frustrated.
(f) Any later date meets with the objection that it largely obliterates
the protection Congress intended for mortgagees of private homes as
distinguished from other secured lenders.
(g) Any later date also brings with it the very serious danger that bid-
ding at the sale itself... will be chilled; potential bidders may be dis-
couraged if they cannot ascertain when, if ever, their interest will
become finalized.
Id. at 1435-36.
77. The Glenn court asserted that "in construing this federal statute, we
think it unnecessary to justify our construction by holding that the sale 'extin-
guishes' or 'satisfies' the mortgage or the lien, or that the mortgage is some-
how 'merged' in the judgment or in the deed of sale under state law." Id. at
1436.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.




variations in state law.8 2
A. THE SEVENTH CIRCuInT: A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A
DIFFERENCE
One commentator has described the Clark decision as a
particularly thoughtful opinion on the complicated question of
the Chapter 13 cure provisions.8 3 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
cannot be faulted for holding that in a lien theory state the
debtor can cure a mortgage default before foreclosure sale. The
problem with Clark is the negative implication of its holding -
that a debtor cannot cure a mortgage default after foreclosure
judgment in title theory states.84
This implication is flawed for two reasons. First, the con-
cept of "title" does not affect the applicability of the automatic
stay in bankruptcy. Whether a creditor will be stayed from
pursuing a foreclosure sale once the debtor files for bankruptcy
is not determined by title status.85 Second, title status bears no
relation to the Chapter 13 cure provisions. Whether debtors
can cure defaults on their mortgages debts should not depend
on whether title to the property securing the debt has
transferred.8 6
1. Title Theory and the Automatic Stay
Title status is not dispositive of the applicability of the au-
tomatic stay8 7 because the bankruptcy estate is not limited to
the debtor's "title" interests in property. The bankruptcy es-
tate is broader,"" encompassing "all legal and equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property."8 9 Before a foreclosure sale,
regardless of when title passes, mortgagors have a substantial
interest in their home: the equity of redemption.
In every jurisdiction - whether title theory or lien theory
82. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
83. Laurence, At Home with the Bankruptcy Code: Residential Leases, In-
stallment Real Estate Contracts and Home Mortgages, 61 AM. BANKR. L. J. 125,
138 (1987).
84. As noted above, the Seventh Circuit bankruptcy courts have inter-
preted Cark as placing the Chapter 13 cure provisions beyond the reach of
many debtors in title theory states. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 14.
88. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203-08 (1983)
(holding that Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in
the bankruptcy estate).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988) (quoted supra note 44).
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- a mortgagor has the right, after default, to pay the entire
mortgage debt and remove the mortgage encumbrance from the
property.90 In virtually every state, this right survives until a
valid foreclosure sale.91 A product of the common law, the eq-
uity of redemption is a substantial right92 "jealously" protected
by the courts.93 Moreover, this equitable right passes to the
bankruptcy estate when the debtor files for bankruptcy.94 As
property of the bankruptcy estate, the filing of a bankruptcy
petition stays any action adverse to the equity of redemption.9 5
A foreclosure sale terminates this right of redemption9 and
therefore is stayed under section 362.9 7
By distinguishing between title and lien theory in Chapter
13 proceedings, the Clark court makes a distinction without a
difference. In either case the mortgage debtor retains an equi-
table right of redemption until the foreclosure sale. Regardless
of when title passes or what mortgage theory the state follows,
the automatic stay should block a foreclosure sale of property
in which the debtor has at least an equity of redemption.
2. Title Theory and the Cure Provisions
Besides the question of the scope of the automatic stay, the
90. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 478.
91. Id.
92. As the Supreme Court has held, "[the equity of redemption] is deemed
essential to the protection of the debtor, who, under pressing necessities, will
often submit to ruinous conditions, expecting or hoping to be able to repay the
loan at its maturity, and thus prevent the conditions from being enforced and
the property sacrificed." Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 337 (1878); see also Mey-
erson v. Werner, 683 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1982) (Pratt, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (quoting this same passage from Peugh).
93. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 478.
94. See In re Fitch, 102 Bankr. 139, 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding
that a mortgagor has a significant equity of redemption interest in the mort-
gaged property until foreclosure sale so that the property is included in the
bankruptcy estate); Anderson v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In re Ander-
son), 29 Bankr. 563, 564 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (mem.) (holding that debtor's
right to redeem repossessed tractor passes to bankruptcy estate and thus court
can compel entity in possession to turn over the property); 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRuPTcY % 541.07, at 541-31 (15th ed. 1989) (stating that "[a]n equity of re-
demption comes within the scope of 'all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property' and as such becomes part of the bankruptcy estate pursu-
ant to section 541(a)(1)").
95. See supra note 14.
96. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 478; see also
Trauner v. Lowry, 369 So. 2d 531, 534 (Ala. 1979) (finding that the equity of
redemption is extinguished by a valid foreclosure sale).
97. See supra note 14 (discussing the breadth of the automatic stay).
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Clark98 opinion suggests that the Seventh Circuit focused on ti-
tle status because it felt obligated to identify the debtor's home
as property of the estate and therefore subject to court adminis-
tration.99 The flaw in this analysis transcends the fact that the
bankruptcy estate consists of the debtors' legal and equitable
interests in property, as well as the debtor's "title" interests.
The Seventh Circuit also errs in searching for an interest in the
home at all.100
The Code's language obviates the need for the Clark court's
preliminary examination of the debtors' rights in the home.
"Claim," which the Code defines as a "right to payment,"10 1 is
the operative word in the Chapter 13 cure provisions. The
debtor's home becomes relevant to the cure provisions only be-
cause claims secured by the debtor's home are treated differ-
ently than those secured by other property.10 2 The appropriate
question is not whether the debtor has title to the home, or
even whether the debtor has an equitable or legal interest in
the home. The central question is whether the debtor was sub-
ject to a "claim" when she filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
13.103
98. In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. See, e.g. Laurence, supra note 85, at 138. Professor Laurence noted:
The court turned to state law to determine the impact of the foreclo-
sure judgment and found that the lender still had only a lien in the
property and therefore the debtor still had an "interest" that became
property of the estate under section 541. Hence, the automatic stay
applied and there was property with which the chapter 13 plan might
deal
Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added). As noted above, a number of courts
have adopted this approach to the cure provisions. See supra note 44.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 39-52 (discussing the Seventh Cir-
cuit's reasoning).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988); see supra note 16.
102. The debtor's home also is relevant to § 1322(b)(5), as subsection (5)
was drafted to address home mortgage loans. See supra note 30.
103. In the words of the Roach court:
the parties err when they focus on how much of a property interest
the Roaches retained following the foreclosure sale. The relevant
text of § 1322(b) speaks of obligations of the debtor as to which cure
of a default is authorized, not of the property interests of the debtor
in property pledged to secure those obligations.
In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1372 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987). See cases cited supra note
60; cf Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 1078 F.2d 1078, 1084 (8th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing analogous cure provisions of Chapter 12 have particular reference to con-
tractual mortgage rights and are not applicable after foreclosure sale has
satisfied the mortgage obligation).
Such analysis is not unique to the Chapter 13 cure provisions. Courts en-
gage in similar reasoning in applying the Code provisions that permit the
bankruptcy trustee to "assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired
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Given the statutory language, the Clark court's focus on ti-
tle status again draws a distinction without a difference. In lien
theory states, the mortgagor has both legal and equitable title
to the property;1 0 4 in title theory states, the mortgagor holds
only equitable title while the mortgagee holds legal title.1 0 5 In
both types of states, however, the mortgagor owes a contractual
debt to the mortgagee. 10 6 Regardless of which theory a state
follows, a mortgage creates a claim, or "a right to payment," in
favor of the mortgagee.
The title distinction not only lacks a statutory basis, but
also is groundless from a policy perspective. The title theory of
mortgages is an historic relic.10 7 The theory originated in 13th
century England when possession was the only way a holder of
a property interest could demonstrate and protect his inter-
est.l s Today, maintenance of written conveyance records ren-
ders the title theory obsolete and most states recognize a
mortgage for what it really is: the creation of a security inter-
est.10 9 Permitting the distinction between title and lien theory
states to determine a debtor's right to cure under Chapter 13
elevates form over substance to an impermissible degree. 110
lease of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988). Rather than focusing on the ob-
ject of the contract or lease, courts first inquire whether the contract or lease
was still in existence at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. See 2 CoL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.02 (15th ed. 1989) (stating that "[i]f the contract or
lease has expired by its own terms or has been terminated prior to the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case, then there is nothing left for the trustee
to assume or assign"). I See Vanderpark Properties v. Buchbinder (In re
Windmill Farms), 841 F.2d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1988).
104. See supra note 46.
105. Id
106. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 4.
107. For a general discussion of the historical development of the law of
mortgages, see Burkhart, supra note 46, at 303-29.
108. Id. at 304; see also United States v. Crawford (In re Crawford), 2
Bankr. 589, 593-95 (N.D. IM. 1980) (tracing the origin of the title theory of
mortgages to real estate transfer practices among Jews in medieval England).
109. Crawford, 2 Bankr. at 594; see also supra note 46. Even title theory
states generally recognize that the mortgagee holds title for security purposes
only:
[Fjor the most part title theory states differ in few significant respects
from their lien theory counterparts. Title theory states today gener-
ally recognize that the mortgagee holds title for security purposes
only, and that, except as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee
... the mortgagor, for practical and theoretical purposes, is to be re-
garded as the owner of the land.
G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 144 (citing TURNER, THE Eq-
UITY OF REDEMPTION 93 (1931)).
110. In the words of one court, "this archaic device should not be determi-
native of debtor-creditor rights at the present day under the Bankruptcy
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Since the Clark decision, bankruptcy courts in the Seventh
Circuit have uniformly held that the right to cure survives un-
til foreclosure sale. 1 ' These courts have done so, however, by
determining that their states followed the lien theory and not
the title theory of mortgages.-12 The potential problem with a
title status approach, then, is application of the Clark rule in ti-
tle theory jurisdictions.113 If courts blindly follow Clark in
these states, the Chapter 13 cure provisions will be denied to
debtors who file for bankruptcy after entry of a foreclosure
judgment. As argued below, terminating the right to cure at
judgment renders the Code either illogical or internally incon-
sistent and yields an inequitable result.
B. THE THiRD CIRCUIT: MERGING AWAY THE MORTGAGE
The Third Circuit correctly approached the Chapter 13
cure provisions, rejecting the Seventh Circuit's mortgage theory
scheme and focusing instead on the contractual relationship be-
tween the parties. 1 4 The Roach court concluded that the right
to cure terminates at foreclosure judgment." 5 Unfortunately,
the Third Circuit stopped short; it failed to scrutinize either the
Code's language or the policy considerations purportedly sup-
porting its decision.
1. An Inconsistent Approach to the Statutory Language
The Third Circuit's analysis rests on section 1322(b)(5),
which provides for the curing of defaults on long-term loans.116
The Roach court ruled that when a mortgage debt merges into
a foreclosure judgment under state law, there no longer is a
long-term obligation that the debtor can cure.117 Under the
court's analysis, the foreclosure judgment converts the mort-
Code." St. Paul Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Young (In re Young), 22 Bankr. 620,
622 (Bankr. N.D. fll. 1982).
111. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Clark
Seventh Circuit Chapter 13 cases).
112. One court was so convinced that the result would be opposite in a title
theory state that it resolved the ambiguity regarding whether Illinois followed
the title theory or lien theory in favor of the lien theory to avoid a conflict
with the right to cure under the federal Bankruptcy Code. See In re Schnupp,
64 Bankr. 763, 768-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (mem.) (discussed supra note 52).
113. Title theory jurisdictions are listed supra note 46.
114. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
115. In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1377 (3d Cir. 1987).
116. See supra note 17.
117. Roach, 824 F.2d at 1377.
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gage claim into a "judicial lien, '1 18 which is beyond the reach of
the section 1322(b)(5) cure provisions.119
This analysis works when the frame of reference is re-
stricted to section 1322(b)(5). When considered in conjunction
with section 1322(b)(2), however, the Third Circuit's argument
breaks down. Section 1322(b)(2) permits modification of any
claim, except those claims "secured only by a security interest"
in the debtor's home.120 "Security interest" is not a generic
term in the Bankruptcy Code. The Code breaks down all liens
into three mutually exclusive categories: security interests,121
statutory liens,2 2 and judicial liens.'2 3
If the foreclosure judgment converts the antecedent "se-
curity interest" into a "judicial lien," the mortgagee's claim is
no longer secured by a "security interest" in the debtor's home.
Rather, the claim is secured by a "judicial lien." Because sec-
tion 1322(b)(2) bars only modification of claims secured by a
"security interest" and not a "judicial lien," the debtor can
modify the mortgagee's claim in her Chapter 13 plan. The
Roach court's analysis, when applied to the other relevant sec-
tion of the cure provisions, produces an anomalous result. A
mortgagee who seeks and obtains a foreclosure judgment ends
up in a worse position. Before judgment, the mortgagee's claim
is subject only to cure of a mortgage default. After judgment,
the mortgagee's claim is subject to modification.
Congress did not intend such a result,24 and accordingly
most courts have ruled that a foreclosure judgment does not
impair the mortgagee's protection under section 1322(b)(2). 125
118. See id. at 1378. The Code defines "judicial lien" as a "lien obtained by
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceed-
ing." 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988).
119. See Roach, 824 F.2d at 1378 (noting that "cure" and "default" are
meaningless with regard to judgments).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
121. Those "created by an agreement." Id. at § 101(45) (emphasis added).
122. Those arising by operation of a statute. Id at § 101(47).
123. Those "obtained by judgment." Id. at § 101(32).
124. See supra note 31 (discussing the concern for mortgage lenders em-
bodied in the Chapter 13 cure provisions).
125. Most courts have focused on the clear intent of § 1322(b)(2) to protect
mortgage lenders, and ruled that a state court foreclosure judgment does not
destroy the protection the section grants to mortgagees. See Seidel v. Larson
(In re Seidel), 752 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that permitting
modification of a mortgagee's claim simply because that claim has been re-
duced to judgment contravenes clear congressional intent); accord In re Brun-
son, 87 Bankr. 304, 311 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); First Fin. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Winkler, 29 Bankr. 771, 775-76 (N.D. III. 1983); see also In re Ivory, 32 Bankr.
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Nonetheless, the Roach court's logic ultimately leads to this
anomalous result. Only by rendering the Code internally in-
consistent can one avoid this anomaly and still adhere to the
Roach decision. For purposes of section 1322(b)(5), the consen-
sual mortgage agreement must be deemed extinguished by the
judgment, but under section 1322(b)(2), one must ignore that
conclusion and hold that the claim against the debtor is still se-
cured by a consensual mortgage agreement.
Courts should avoid a construction of Chapter 13 that
defeats one of its primary purposes - to protect mortgage lend-
ers from modification of their claims2 6 - or renders it inter-
nally inconsistent. Courts can avoid such a result by rejecting
the Third Circuit's extreme deference to state court judgments.
As long as the mortagee's "right to payment" remains unsatis-
fied, the debtor cannot modify its terms, but can cure payment
defaults.12 Because the mortgage debt - whether in the form
of a judgment or not - is outstanding until the property is sold
788, 793 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (rejecting an interpretation of section 1322(b)(2)
that would give mortgagees less rights than they had before entry of a foreclo-
sure judgment); In re Collins, 19 Bankr. 209, 211 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)
(same).
Some courts, however, have mechanically applied § 1322(b)(2) to the detri-
ment of mortgagees. In In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981),
the mortgagee obtained a foreclosure judgment of $48,000 before the debtor
filed under Chapter 13. Id at 800. The bankruptcy court held that the debtor
could not cure the mortgage default under § 1322(b)(5), as there was no longer
a claim that could be cured. Id at 801. The court further held, however, that
because the claim was no longer secured by a "security interest," the debtor
could modify the claim under § 1322(b)(2). The Garner court applied the
"cram down" provisions of §§ 1325(a) and 506(a), allowing the secured claim to
be reduced from the judgment amount to the value of the debtor's home. Id
The differential was treated as an unsecured claim and disposed of in accord-
ance with the plan's treatment of unsecured claims. Id; see also In re Jordan,
5 Bankr. 59, 63 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (holding that the mortgagee who has ob-
tained a judgment lien is not protected by the ban on modification in
§ 1322(b)(2)).
126. See supra note 31.
127. In addition to rendering the Code internally consistent, this approach
more closely approximates congressional intent, had Congress considered this
issue. As argued in a recent case, courts must recognize the crucial distinction
between the common law doctrine of merger, see supra note 60, and statutory
interpretation. See Federal Land Bank v. Cupple Bros., 889 F. 2d 764, 769-70
(1989) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
In Cupples Bros., debtor farmers sought to restructure their agricultural
loan pursuant to the Agriculture Credit Act of 1987. Id. at 766. The 8th Cir-
cuit rejected the debtors' attempt, holding that the loan merged into a state
court judgment of foreclosure before the effective date of the statute and
therefore was no longer in existence when the statute became effective. Id. at
767. This ruling brought a persuasive and well-reasoned dissent:
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at foreclosure sale,las this approach yields a termination point
of at least foreclosure sale.
Reading "claim" in the cure provisions to refer to the pre-
judgment agreement between the parties does not depart dra-
matically from the statutory interpretation adopted by most
courts, including the Third Circuit in Roach. Virtually every
court has held that the term "claim" in the cure provisions re-
fers to the pre-acceleration claim.129 Holding otherwise, these
courts note, would render the Chapter 13 cure provisions mean-
ingless.130 Similarly, the provisions are drastically weakened
when state court judgments are regarded as dispositive of the
debtor's right to cure.
2. The Roach Analysis: A Cursory Look at Policy
One could tolerate a statutory construct that produced an
illogical or internally inconsistent result if strong policy argu-
ments supported such an interpretation. In this case, however,
policy considerations suggest the opposite - that foreclosure
judgment is not an appropriate point for termination of the
statutory right to cure.
Did the loan, by virtue of being reduced to judgment, immediately
cease to be a loan in the sense that Congress used that word?
I think the answer is no. In deciding otherwise, the Court relies
on the familiar common-law doctrine of merger.... "Merger" is sim-
ply a way of saying that a debt that has been reduced to judgment is
treated differently, for some purposes, from a debt that has not been
reduced to judgment. After judgment, for example, no new action
may be brought on the debt. Such an action is barred by the merger
aspect of the doctrine of res judicata....
It makes no sense to transplant this merger concept into the pres-
ent case and apply it mechanically to quite a different question, a
question not of common-law doctrines but of statutory interpreta-
tion.... [TMhe Court's use of the merger doctrine to interpret an Act
of Congress is based on the fallacy that a word must mean the same
thing every time it is used. If a debt or a loan reduced to judgment is
no longer a debt or a loan for res judicata purposes, the Court seems
to say, then it can't be a loan for purposes of the Agricultural Credit
Act of 1987. It seems to me extremely unlikely that Congress, which
passed the law in an effort to help farmers in trouble, intended its
purpose to be confined by a technical state-law doctrine conceived and
applied for quite different purposes. I believe that both borrowers
and lenders, in everyday business dealings and speech, would continue
to think of the Cupples Brothers as having a ... loan . .. notwith-
standing the fact that the Bank had secured a judgment.
Id at 769-70. (Arnold, J., dissenting)
128. G. NELSON & D. WHImAN, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 4.
129. See supra note 37.




A state court judgment of foreclosure does not, in a practi-
cal sense, alter the parties' relationship. The judgment con-
firms what the parties already knew: the entire debt is due and
the mortgagee may sell the property at a later foreclosure
sale.1 31 Moreover, until foreclosure sale the mortgagee and
mortgagor are the only parties who have an interest in the
home. Third party buyers at foreclosure sales are not yet in-
volved. The Third Circuit acknowledged that the congressional
intent to protect the debtor precludes courts from cutting off
the right to cure at acceleration.132 The Roach court nonethe-
less held that mere judicial confirmation of the accelerated
debt, a confirmation without practical effect, was dispositive of
the debtor's right to cure.
The Third Circuit found that drawing a line between accel-
eration and foreclosure judgment did not undermine the Code's
policies because the complaint gives debtors notice that their
rights are in jeopardy. L33 The court held that this notice was
sufficient to enable Chapter 13 debtors to seek legal advice in a
timely fashion. 3 4
The Roach court's estimation of the average debtor's legal
sophistication is questionable. Often unsophisticated consumer
debtors seek counsel only after judgment, when a foreclosure
sale is imminent. 3 5 After reviewing data on the number of
pending Chapter 13 mortgage foreclosure cases, a bankruptcy
judge within the Roach court's own Third Circuit concluded
that denying debtors the opportunity to satisfy136 a foreclosure
judgment drastically reduces the number of debtors who could
use the cure provisions to retain their homes.13 7 The large
131. Zaretsky, supra note 36, at 477. In New Jersey, a foreclosure judg-
ment "fixes the amount due under the mortgage and directs the sale of the
real estate to raise the funds to satisfy the amount due." In re Roach, 824 F.2d
1370, 1378 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Eisen v. Kostakos, 116 N.J. Super. 358, 365,
282 A.2d 421, 424 (App. Div. 1971). In Wisconsin, a foreclosure judgment "does
little more than determine that the mortgagor is in default, the amount of
principle and interest unpaid, [and] the amounts due... [the] mortgagee for
taxes." In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Marshall & II-
sley Bank v. Greene, 227 Wis. 155, 164, 278 N.W. 425, 429 (1938).
132. Roach, 824 F.2d. at 1377 (noting that "if § 1322(b) is construed not to
authorize the reversal of an acceleration of home mortgage debt, it will rarely
provide to debtors the relief contemplated by Congress").
133. Id at 1378. See supra note 65.
134. Roach, 824 F.2d at 1378.
135. 5 COLLIER ON BANIxupTcy 1322.09, at 1322-25 (15th ed. 1985) (citing
Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1436; Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 27).
136. See infra note 136.
137. In re Brunson, 87 Bankr. 304, 307 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988). In Brunson,
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number of reported cases in which homeowners suffered a fore-
closure judgment prior to filing for bankruptcy indicates that
many debtors do not seek legal advice upon commencement of
a foreclosure proceeding. 38 Presumably, if mortgage debtors
sought such counsel, they would have filed for bankruptcy
before judgment to ensure their right to cure.
The Third Circuit recognized that extending the cut-off pe-
riod beyond foreclosure judgment would benefit some Chapter
13 debtors. 139 According to the court, however, this benefit was
relatively small compared to the harm that would result from
such an extension.140 In particular, the Roach court was con-
cerned that overturning state court judgments would create un-
certainties in the application of state property law and cloud
real estate titles.141
This argument is unconvincing because completed foreclo-
sure sales, including those in when third parties have purchased
the property, are regularly set aside under the Bankruptcy
Code.142 The policy behind avoiding foreclosure sales differs
the Chapter 13 debtors were precluded from curing their mortgage defaults
under Roach and thus sought to "satisfy" the foreclosure judgment over the
life of the plan.
138. See, e.g., In re Brunson, 87 Bankr. at 305; In re McKeon, 86 Bankr. 350
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (consolidation of twenty-three cases in which the debtor
filed after a judgment of foreclosure had been entered); Brown v. National
State Bank, (In re Brown), 73 Bankr. 306, 307 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987); In re Mar-
tinez, 73 Bankr. 300, 301 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987); In re Akins, 55 Bankr. 183, 184
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); First Fin. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Winkler, 29 Bankr.
771, 772 (N.D. 111. 1983); In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799, 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981); In re Paglia, 8 Bankr. 937, 938 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Pearson, 10
Bankr. 189, 191 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Jenkins, 14 Bankr. 748, 749
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); United Cos. Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 Bankr. 178, 180,
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
139. Roach, 824 F.2d at 1378.
140. I& See text accompanying supra note 66.
141. Roach, 824 F.2d at 1378. Given that the cure provisions clearly are an
attempt to reconcile the interests of mortgage lenders and mortgage borrow-
ers, the Third Circuit should have considered the direct cost to mortgagees of
setting aside state court judgments. Assessing these costs, however, the court
would have found that disregarding state court judgments of foreclosure
would impose very little economic burden on mortgage lenders. First, ex-
penses incurred by the mortgagee in the foreclosure process are usually recov-
erable from the debtor under the mortgage agreement. Zaretsky, supra note
36, at 447. Second, until a later point in the foreclosure process, possibly sale,
the mortgagee will not have taken any action in reliance on the state court
judgment. Id.
142. The Code permits the trustee to avoid transfers of interests of the
debtor that are constructively fraudulent. The Code provisions read, in perti-
nent part:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
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from the rationale for setting aside state foreclosure judgments
under section 1322(b). Nonetheless, if states endure this "un-
certainty" in the application of state property law and this
"clouding" of real estate titles, they certainly can handle these
problems should a bankruptcy court nullify a judgment of fore-
closure. Moreover, this minor blow to the finality of state court
judgments must be weighed against the far more deleterious
consequences of blindly respecting these foreclosure
judgments.143
Overall, the Third Circuit approached the problem cor-
rectly. Instead of following the blind lead of mortgage theory,
the court adhered to the Code provisions and addressed the
contractual relationship between the mortgagee and mortgagor.
The Roach court erred, however, by concluding that the cure
provisions were inapplicable if the mortgagee already had ob-
tained a state court judgment of foreclosure. In addition to ren-
dering the Code either illogical or internally inconsistent, the
court's holding contravenes the policy considerations underly-
ing the Chapter 13 cure provisions.
C. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT: AN EQUITABLE RESULT FROM A
QUESTIONABLE APPROACH
Although the Sixth Circuit reached an equitable result by
holding that the right to cure survives a foreclosure judg-
ment,1' the court's analysis incorrectly disregarded state law.
It is a basic premise of bankruptcy that absent some overriding
property... that was made or incurred on or within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily-
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change for such transfer... ; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made...
or became insolvent as a result of such a transfer ... ;
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
This provision is regularly invoked to avoid foreclosure sales conducted in
the year prior to filing. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Hulm (In re Hulm),
738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984) (remanding to bankruptcy court to determine if
debtor received "reasonably equivalent value" at foreclosure sale); Pruitt v.
Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(holding that foreclosure price of $22,500 for property with fair market value
of $110,000 not "reasonably equivalent value;" foreclosure sale avoided); Lake-
view Inv. Group v. Pemberton (In re Lakeview Inv. Group), 40 Bankr. 449
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (avoiding foreclosure sale).
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting that debtor-home-
owners often fail to seek legal advice until after entry of a foreclosure
judgment).
144. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
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federal interest, state law defines the property interests of the
debtor.145 By simply ignoring state law, the Glenn court ne-
glected this doctrine and thus limited the strength of its deci-
sion.146 The final outcome in Glenn - permitting the debtor to
cure the mortgage default after foreclosure judgment - com-
ports with the Code's language and important policy considera-
tions.147 The court, however, could have reached this result by
expressly ruling that the Bankruptcy Code trumps any state
law that terminates the right to cure at judgment. If the Sixth
Circuit had addressed the role of state law, other courts could
give Glenn the authority that its equitable result deserves.
D. A LOGICAL APPROACH TO POST-JUDGMENT CURE UNDER
CHAPTER 13
The above analysis suggests several straightforward rules
courts should follow in addressing the effect of a foreclosure
judgment on the Chapter 13 cure provisions.
1. State law governs absent an overriding federal interest.
The general rule in bankruptcy is that state law deter-
mines the debtor's property rights absent an overriding federal
interest.1 48 Regardless of whether the Bankruptcy Code ulti-
mately preempts state law, a proper analysis of the cure provi-
sions at least must begin with an examination of the debtor's
state law interests. The Glenn court violated this fundamental
premise. Although the Sixth Circuit held that the right to cure
survives a foreclosure judgment, this equitable result rests on
analytically shaky ground.
145. See supra note 56.
146. Very few courts outside the Sixth Circuit have adopted the Glenn ap-
proach of setting a uniform cut-off point for exercise of the Chapter 13 cure
provisions. One of the few cases to apparently follow Glenn is Boromei v. Sun
Bank, 92 Bankr. 516 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). Even in Boromei, however, the
court held that the overriding federal interest of rehabilitating debtors pre-
empted state law, which, the creditors argued, extinguished the mortgage debt
at judgment. Id. at 517-18. The Boromei court did not ignore state law; it
ruled that there was a compelling federal interest to the contrary, an approach
different from that of the Glenn court and well within the Supreme Court's
Butner framework.
The Glenn court itself recognized the doctrinal weakness in its "prag-
matic" approach, noting that its list of policy reasons in support of foreclosure
sale as the proper cut-off point "may form a large target of criticism." In re
Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428, 1435 (6th Cir. 1985).
147. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 56.
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2. The Automatic Stay Blocks a Foreclosure Sale Regardless
of Mortgage Theory.
Once a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, a court must de-
cide if the automatic stay blocks further foreclosure proceed-
ings. To do so, the court need only find the bankruptcy estate
has an interest in the mortgaged property that will be adversely
affected by further action in the foreclosure proceeding. An in-
terest in the property is a broader concept than the Seventh
Circuit's focus on "title." Title is an interest that passes to the
bankruptcy estate, but so is the debtor's equity of redemp-
tion.149 In every jurisdiction, regardless of which theory of
mortgages the state follows, the debtor who files for bank-
ruptcy before foreclosure sale has an interest in the property
that triggers the automatic stay to block a foreclosure sale.
3. The Right to Cure: A Separate Question
Whether the debtor can cure a mortgage default does not
depend on whether the state follows the title theory or lien
theory of mortgages, or when "title" officially passes from the
mortgagor. These mortgage theory questions are unrelated to
determining whether a debtor can cure a default on an obliga-
tion owed to a creditor. The Seventh Circuit incorrectly asked
what interest the debtors have in their property, rather than
what interest the debtors have in the mortgage debt.150 The
debtor's right to cure depends on state contract law, not mort-
gage theory. Thus, the appropriate question is whether, at the
time of the bankruptcy filing, the debtors were subject to a
"claim" of the type described in section 1322(b)(5). 151
The Roach court recognized the folly of focusing on the
debtor's interest in the property.152 The Third Circuit correctly
regarded the Chapter 13 cure provisions as a question of state
contract law, not mortgage theory. The court erred, however,
in deeming the cure provisions inapplicable once the mortgage
debt merged into a state court judgment of foreclosure. Per-
mitting entry of a state court foreclosure judgment to deter-
mine the applicability of the Chapter 13 cure provisions renders
these provisions either illogical or internally inconsistent. 153
The Code's language as well as policy considerations suggest
149. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
150. See generally supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
152. I&
153. See supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text.
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that the right to cure survives foreclosure judgment, regardless
of whether state law "merges" or extinguishes the mortgage
debt at judgment.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code affords debtors the
right to cure a default on their home mortgage. The federal
circuit courts agree that this right survives a mortgagee's accel-
eration of the mortgage debt. The federal appellate courts disa-
gree whether Chapter 13 debtors can cure their mortgage
defaults if the mortgagee accelerates the debt and obtains a
foreclosure judgment before the debtor files for bankruptcy.
Because of this judicial controversy, entry of a state court judg-
ment of foreclosure may deny debtor-homeowners the opportu-
nity to cure their mortgage defaults and save their family
homes.
This Note argues that the federal circuit courts have mis-
construed and therefore misapplied the Chapter 13 cure provi-
sions. The Seventh Circuit unduly focuses on state mortgage
theory. The language of the cure provisions does not support
predicating a debtor's right to cure on whether state law fol-
lows the lien or title theory of mortgages. Although the Third
Circuit correctly frames the issue as one of state contract law
and not mortgage theory, its conclusion that debtors may lose
the right to cure at foreclosure judgment contravenes the statu-
tory language as well as the policy considerations underlying
the Chapter 13 cure provisions. Finally, the Sixth Circuit ig-
nores a fundamental premise of bankruptcy law - that state
law governs the debtor's property and contract rights absent an
overriding federal interest - and thus undermines its holding
that the right to cure survives foreclosure judgments.
Analysis of the Chapter 13 cure provisions should begin
with the debtor's state law interests. In every jurisdiction, a
debtor who files for bankruptcy before foreclosure sale has an
equitable right to redeem her home. This equitable interest
passes to the bankruptcy estate, therefore the Code's automatic
stay blocks a mortgagee from initiating a foreclosure sale.
Moreover, a foreclosure judgment merely confirms the mortga-
gee's right to payment, it does not extinguish the debtor's right
to cure her mortgage defaults. Proper construction of section
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1322(b), as well as relevant policy considerations, require that
the debtor's right to cure survive foreclosure judgment.
Douglas A. Winthrop
